REVIEWS

Geoffrey Sampson, *Schools of linguistics: competition and evolution.* (Hutchinson University Library.) London: Hutchinson, 1980. Pp. 283.

Schools of linguistics is a valuable survey of 20th century linguistic theory. Beginning with a discussion of 19th century historical linguistics, Sampson goes on to discuss the following 'schools': Saussure, the Descriptivists (including American structural linguistics from Boas to Harris), the Prague School, TG Grammar and Generative Phonology, Relational Grammar (embracing Hjelmslev and Stratificational Linguistics) and the London School (covering Firthian, Neo-Firthian, and Systemic approaches). In addition Sampson includes a chapter on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis which does not, as one might at first have expected, deal with American anthropological linguistics as a school. No survey of this kind could fail to be stimulating, but Sampson has produced a very readable and at times provocative book as well. It updates and treats at a more advanced level much of the material presented in Dineen 1967, while avoiding the often abstruse and needlessly technical account in Davis 1973. As such, *Schools of linguistics* should prove a useful addition to reading lists at the advanced undergraduate and postgraduate levels.

Linguists familiar with Sampson's linguistic views will not be surprised to find schools presented very much from a 'generalist' as opposed to a 'particularist' perspective (to use the terms from Sampson 1975:4). That is, if we divide linguists into those with a philosophical/psychological world view (the phoneme-to-neuron or phoneme-to-reality group) and those with a descriptive/ethnographic orientation (the phoneme-to-culture or phoneme-to-social-reality group), then Sampson falls rather extremely into the former category. At the beginning of *The form of language*, for example, Sampson thanks Chomsky 'for CREATING the subject' (1975:viii; emphasis added) on which he has written; and in *Liberty and language* (1979:9) he describes himself as linguistically speaking more Chomskyan than Chomsky (politically of course the two are polar opposites). Given this orientation, it is somewhat ironic that one's two lasting impressions of *Schools of linguistics* have to do with: (i) the very critical (I should perhaps say 'irreverent') stance adopted with respect to TG Grammar and Generative Phonology, both schools with

a strong philosophical/psychological orientation; and (ii) the very friendly stance adopted with respect to the Prague and London Schools, whose ethnographic orientation is well known. Unfortunately this friendly stance does little to mitigate, and functions almost as an apology for, the anti-ethnographic bias which leads Sampson to gloss over social and functional interpretations of language in several chapters.

In this review I will concentrate on redressing Sampson's generalist stance, being rather too much in sympathy with his approach to Chom-skyan linguistics to argue against it. I will comment in detail only on the chapter dealing with the London School, leaving it to members of other schools to address exhaustively any injustices done to them.

In Chapter 1, 'Prelude: the nineteenth century', Sampson reviews those developments in 19th century historical linguistics which set the stage for Saussure's synchronic revolution. The account is less chrono-logical than that of Robins 1979 and ignores the work of von Humboldt, which had little impact in this period. Sampson focuses in particular on three areas: the development of the concept of sound laws out of work on formal correspondences within the historical-comparative paradigm; the conception among workers in the field of their research as science; and the search for a theory of language change, particularly along the lines of a Darwinian model. With the ascendancy of the neo-grammarian movement, sound laws were conceived as exceptionless rule-governed processes, and historical linguistics as the science which studied them. But the neo-grammarians' insistence on language change originating in the indiv-idual, and their focus on the data of language change, led to an often caustic rejection of theorising about language change in general. It is Sampson's thesis that it was this lack of a satisfactory THEORY of language change which made the 20th century ripe for Saussure.

In Chapter 2, 'Saussure: language as social fact', Sampson discusses naturally enough the legacy of Saussurian dualisms – synchronic and diachronic, syntagmatic and paradigmatic, and langue and parole. For Sampson the key issue appears to be to what extent language can be char-acterised as a social as opposed to an individual fact. Saussure's concept of langue as an aspect of collective consciousness, in Durkheim's sense, stands of course in sharp contrast to a philosophical/psychological view of competence as something in people's heads, and is thus something of a challenge to Sampson's generalist orientation. Unfortunately, Sampson's focus on this issue is at the expense of an adequate discussion of Saussure's concept of the sign, whose arbitrariness was for Saussure the underpinning of those dualisms noted above. Culler 1976, in a far more satisfying treatment, notes that for Saussure it was the arbitrariness of the sign which ensured that the neo-grammarians' sound laws operate blindly. And it is this arbitrariness which leads Saussure to treat language as form not substance; and if as form, then as a set of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations, interlocking and constituting a single 'état de langue'. Sampson's slight treatment of the sign would be harmless enough

if Saussure's own formulation of the concept could be simply taken for granted in 20th century linguistics. But there is every reason to believe that it cannot. For Saussure both signifiant and signifié were arbitrary – the sign orders both a conceptual and an acoustic morass. Modern linguis-tics has always been comfortable with the idea of an arbitrary signifiant, but the idea of an equally arbitrary signifié has never been widely accept-ed. Indeed, Sampson seems not really to appreciate Saussure's position on the arbitrariness of the signifié, attributing to Putnam a long argument having to do with just this fact. Almost incredibly, in the middle of this argument, Sampson points out that 'PART OF the concept of "beech" is "not elm" and vice versa' (52; emphasis added) without even mentioning Saussure's discussion of value, content and signification. All this has the effect of completely undercutting Saussure's interpretation of language as a semiotic system, and for Saussure's contribution to structuralism outside linguistics readers will have to look elsewhere.

In Chapter 3, 'The Descriptivists', Sampson turns to Bloomfieldian linguistics. Boas is introduced as the father of American structuralism, and his attention to linguistic relativity (looking at each language in its own terms) is briefly reviewed. Sampson then turns to the question of the Bloomfieldians' attitude to behaviourism and discovery procedures. He interprets the positivist orientation of Bloomfield's work as healthy as far as phonology, morphology and syntax were concerned, but as naive once meaning was considered. And he criticises the Bloomfieldians at length for failing to develop a theory of language because of: (i) the attention given to discovery procedures; and (ii) their exaggerated stance with respect to linguistic relativity – namely that languages vary without limit and unpredictably (a position which is in fact attributed by Joos 1957:96 to Boasian linguistics; I know of no references to any Amer-ican linguist actually arguing for this position). In this Sampson accepts and further reifies the straw Bloomfieldian man set up by Chomskyans to promote their revolution.

I would like to make two criticisms of Sampson's interpretation. First, it is important, as Gleason 1975 points out, to distinguish between heuristics and theory, where heuristics refers to a set of analytical tech-niques and theory to an interpretation of the results of these. Now Bloom-fieldians avoided the term 'theory'; but it would be wrong to characterise their interest in discovery procedures as a simple interest in heuristics. As Gleason suggests, the Bloomfieldians' term for heuristics was 'short cuts', and for them theory was in fact the discussion of discovery pro-cedures. To my mind there is nothing inherently atheoretical about work-ing on discovery procedures. Indeed Chomsky's (1957) abandonment of the search for their formalisation was not at all a shift from an interest in heuristics to one in theory, but a shift in what he thought linguistic theory should be about. In fact, Chomsky admits openly that the goals he sets for linguistic theory are weaker than those pursued by the Bloomfieldians (for Chomsky a theory chooses between descriptions, it does not generate

them). I see no reason why the Bloomfieldians' concern with ways of 'automatically' deriving a description from a corpus cannot be interpreted as a rich and exciting theoretical interest, one that might eventually explain HOW a child learns a language, or HOW people 'parse' a sentence in conversation (no matter how often a generativist claims neutrality in his use of the term 'generative', his productive bias is clear). Sampson's dismissal of Bloomfieldians as atheoretical is surely misguided.

Second, and more seriously, Chapter 3 has nothing whatever to say about anthropological linguistics after Boas. Sapir's name does not even appear, and there is no reference to the contribution he and his students made to American structuralism. What seems to be going on here is that Sapir and his followers have become discredited in modern linguistics because of their ethnographic concerns (in this Chomskyans simply follow in the neo-Bloomfieldians' footsteps: note the insulting patronising notes by Joos after Sapir's article in his 1957 collection). Once discredited, their contribution to 'generalist' linguistics is completely ignored (in this, post-1957 characterisations of the Bloomfieldian period are remiss, where the Bloomfieldians themselves were not; see for example Harris's reviews of the works of Newman (1944), Hoijer (1945), and Sapir himself (1951)). It is disheartening that Sampson has allowed his anti-ethnographic bias to so pervert the history of American structuralism; especially so when it is clear that workers in the Sapir tradition could hardly have been but sympathetic to Sampson's criticism of the Bloomfieldians' behaviourist approach to meaning, their focus on discovery procedures, and so on. One wonders how an article such as Sapir's 'The psychological reality of the phoneme' (1933) could fail to count as linguistic theory, even in Sampson's understanding of the term. Hymes & Fought 1975 provides an essential antidote to this chapter.

As one might expect, given this second point, only a final paragraph is devoted to the work of Pike and tagmemics in general. The title of Pike's *Language in relation to a unified theory of the structure of human behavior* (1967) is apparently enough to guarantee his exclusion from Sampson's book. But, as with Sapir and his students, an interest in ethnographic linguistics does not guarantee the irrelevance of Pike's descriptive and theoretical contributions to general linguistics. Pike was heavily involved in many of the late Bloomfieldian debates – the question of grammatical prerequisites to phonological analysis comes easily to mind. Moreover, in several crucial respects, Pike's model of language differed from that of the neo-Bloomfieldians: distinct phonological, grammatical, and later discourse hierarchies were proposed; nodes on constituency trees were labelled for both function and class (the tagmeme); the binary segmentation of IC analysis was not followed, and so on. Sampson is wrong to dismiss such factors as superficialities (he himself argues for the need for a phonological hierarchy (1970)) – try for a moment to imagine, philosophical issues aside, the shape of Chomsky's grammar had it derived from tagmemic rather than mainstream neo-Bloomfieldian descriptions. I will return to Sampson's treatment (or rather the lack of treatment) of continuity in American linguistics in considering Chapter 6.

In Chapter 4, 'the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis', Sampson examines the interrelatedness of language, thought, and reality. The relation between language and thought has been a particularly vexing one for modern linguistics. Several prominent 20th century linguists, whether basing their argument on the arbitrariness of the signifié as in the case of Saussure and Hjelmslev, on linguistic relativity as in the case of Sapir and Whorf, or on the basis of rejecting the duality in the first place as in the case of Firth, have argued that it is a logical consequence of their perspectives that language determines or is thought and conditions or is our perception of reality and not vice versa. This is a strong and fascinating claim, and one that many linguists shy away from, so strong is the contrary common sense view implicit in western ideology. Sampson approaches the question from a philosophical/psychological perspective, discussing to what extent language can be said to determine both how we think and what we perceive. He dismisses an example of purportedly illogical thinking attributed by Lévy-Bruhl to the Bororó on the basis of their claim that they are red parakeets (when they patently are not by all appearances) and goes on to discuss the work of Berlin & Kay 1969 on colour terms. I personally find such a discussion of Whorf unproductive – if Whorf IS right, we will never know it. This is presumably what Sampson has in mind in describing the hypothesis as trivially true at best. Interpreted from the point of view of ethnographic linguistics, however, I think the hypothesis does have empirical content. In this interpretation it is the relation between language and social structure (or culture, if you will) which is at stake. And Whorf's own stress on the idea of HABITUAL behaviour and his frequent references to FASHIONS of speaking are evidence that this interpretation is tenable. On this reading the hypothesis refers to a conspiracy of covert meanings (see in particular Whorf 1956:158) reflecting ways of analysing and reporting experience which have become fixed in the language. This is not to say that we cannot turn language back on itself and escape through a conscious act of semiotic reconstruction (this presumably is just what we academics are paid to do), but rather to argue that most of the time we ARE at the mercy of an ideology the language encodes. The work of Bernstein (1971, 1973, 1975) and his colleagues provides some evidence for the hypothesis (there are striking parallels between the reactions of philosophical/psychological linguists to Bernstein and Whorf) and Fowler et al. 1979 and Kress & Hodge 1979 present further elaboration. In concluding this chapter Sampson appears to grant the validity of an ethnographic interpretation of Whorf but sees little significance in it in light of 'the ability that individual men possess to break conceptual fetters which other men have forged' (102). His generalist orientation to the individual as opposed to the social is, as ever, clear.

Chapter 5, 'Functional linguistics: the Prague school', is perhaps the most satisfying in the book. It provides a clear and sympathetic account of the school's functional orientation to language. For the Prague School, a functional orientation to language manifested itself in three ways. First of all, there was a concern with paradigmatic relations – the function of a linguistic unit within the system. This characterised both Trubetzkoy's work on phonology and Martinet's functional interpretation of language change. Second, there is the question of the function of linguistic items in a text. The school's work on functional sentence perspective is crucial here. Sampson notes Mathesius's introduction of the concepts of theme and rheme which formalised this functional perspective in their work on syntax. Mathesius, in his use of the terms, is unfortunately responsible for the confusion of theme and rheme with 'given' and 'new' in much later work, and it would have been helpful if Sampson had cleared up this problem with reference to Halliday instead of exacerbating it by writing that passive is not the only way of adjusting functional sentence perspective: 'it is possible to mark *John* as rheme rather than theme in *John kissed Eve* by STRESSING it' (105, emphasis added). Third, there was the function of text in context. Sampson mentions Bühler's classification of speech functions, and then refers to the Prague school's concern with stylistics and register. Sampson notes that a concern with stylistics is outside the scope of his book but some discussion of the concept of foregrounding as developed by Mukařovský 1977 would have been useful since it is this concept which makes explicit the linguistic manifestation of verbal art, distinguishing the linguistic approach to literature from that of other disciplines. After a discussion of Jakobsonian universals, Sampson ends the chapter on a rather curious note, discussing Labov's work on language and social context. There is something distinctly odd about this particular allocation of linguists to schools. But it is no doubt explained by the fact that in spite of having dismissed sociolinguistics as peripheral and outside 'core' linguistics as defined from the generalist perspective (10), Sampson cannot avoid incorporating somewhere in his book the invaluable methodological and descriptive contributions of the variationists.

Labov's demonstration of the feasibility of studying sound change in progress is of course of great significance in modern linguistics and bears critically on the neo-grammarians' conception of sound laws and how they work, on Saussure's discussion of langue and parole, on Sapir's notion of drift, on Chomsky's idealised speaker, on the kind of data linguists should be analysing, and so on. As such, the work of Labov and his colleagues surely provides the clearest possible vindication of a descriptive/ethnographic perspective in linguistic theory. That Sampson relegates his discussion of the work of Labov, the Sankoffs, Bickerton, Bailey and their students to four pages in this chapter is one of the two most serious failings of the book (the other being Sampson's treatment of Hjelmslev, which will be discussed below). Sampson himself seems uncomfortable with the philosophical/psychological interpretation of sociolinguistics as the study of the correlation between language and sociology rather than the mutual determination and explanation of one by the other. Hopefully variation theory will receive recognition with the chapter it deserves in future editions of the book.

In Chapter 6, 'Noam Chomsky and generative grammar', Sampson turns to the work of Chomsky with respect to TG grammar (generative phonology is considered in Chapter 8). Sampson briefly introduces readers to Chomsky's formalisation of syntax in generative rules and then presents a critique of the linguistic theory which Chomsky bases on this formulation. Although attracted by Chomsky's theory of language universals (or what it is about language that can't be explained and is therefore innate), Sampson expresses serious reservations about the impact of this theory on linguistic research. His main complaint is that while Chomsky's formalisation of syntax as a finite system of rules generating an infinite set of sentences made an empirical approach to syntax possible for the first time, his rationalist orientation to intuitions as the data which linguists describe has made research anything but scientific. In Sampson's view this problem is compounded by Chomskyans' tendency to express universals in terms of a notation system which does not permit other than the predicted patterns, with the ever-present danger that what cannot be described will not be observed. It is of course part and parcel of all linguistic revolutions to redistribute the concerns of theory and heuristics, in the sense of the terms used earlier. Chomskyans' use of intuition and their focus on universals can be seen in this light as a legitimisation of certain Bloomfieldian heuristics (i.e. short cuts having to do with tendencies in language and the use of intuition in analysis; cf. Gleason 1975). But in Sampson's view the advancement of intuitions and universals to the status of theory is premature and has been lethal. He argues for a return to the empiricist methodology of the Bloomfieldian period and a reorientation within linguistics to the description of languages on their own terms, so that a viable theory of universals can eventually be constructed. It is hard not to be sympathetic with this position.

One of the refreshing aspects of this chapter is the attention Sampson gives to socio-political aspects of the competition between and evolution of schools. Such is the force of personality in academe, and the importance of being in the right place at the right time, that real progress is made only over the centuries (or even millenia as in the case of Pāṇini). The power of Chomsky's polemics, and the eclipsing stance adopted by him and his followers to even those linguists to whom they owed the greatest debt, has probably not been in the interests either of scholarship or productive debate. Although he does criticise the Chomskyan school for its egocentricity (especially in Chapter 8), Sampson himself does little to bring out the continuity between Chomsky and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. One feels for the first time in the book that differences between schools have been emphasised at the expense of

historical relationships. Chomskyan linguistics could only be the (albeit rebellious) child of neo-Bloomfieldianism. To take just two examples, Chomsky's argument for the necessity of transformations depends entirely on his implicit assumption that the only kind of syntactic analysis which can be formalised in a generative way is IC analysis; similarly the Bloomfieldians' preoccupation with the problem of just how morphemes could be described as CONSISTING OF phonemes is clearly reflected in the lack of attention given by generative phonology to a phonological hierarchy, syllable structure, and prosody in general.

Linguistics who believe with Postal 1972 that TG grammar uncovered more facts in its first twelve years of research than could fit into a dozen works like Jesperson's seven-volume *Modern English grammar* will not like this chapter but will certainly enjoy Newmeyer 1980, which ups the ante, claiming that more has been discovered 'in the last 25 years than in the previous 2500' (250).

In Chapter 7, 'Relational Grammar: Hjelmslev, Lamb, Reich', Sampson turns to a consideration of what is generally known as stratificational linguistics. Hjelmslev is dismissed in a page and a half as 'abstruse', 'airy fairy', and guilty of the dilettantish and aprioristic theorising for which he criticised others (Sampson is virtually Bloomfieldian in his anti-theory polemics here). Hjelmslev is apparently included as worthy of mention simply because Lamb has made so much of his very Saussurian concept of language as a network of relationships. I am at somewhat of a loss as to how appropriately to respond to Sampson here. It is true that Hjelmslev is difficult. Exemplification for many of his ideas must be provided by the reader. He does not directly attack many of the ideas of his contemporaries. Nor are there any well-known descriptions deriving from his theory. But Sampson's reaction is undergraduate at best; in a book of this kind one expects an attempt at interpretation in place of so shallow a treatment. My own reaction to Hjelmslev on reading him some ten years ago was like Sampson's: but with each subsequent reading I have become more convinced of his status as the leading theoretician of the century. The proof of the pudding will be in the eating, as Sampson puts it; and in the long run I think Sampson will be more embarrassed by this page and a half than by any other section of *Schools of linguistics*.

A review is no place to do justice to Hjelmslev's ideas. Readers interested in his work will find in Halliday's systemic/functional grammar a far more Hjelmslevian theory than that articulated by Lamb, incorporating Hjelmslev's formulation of system manifested in process, with system interpreted paradigmatically and process syntagmatically, and language treated as the expression plane of higher-order semiotics. Unfortunately Sampson does not understand the work of either linguist well enough to note the connections. Readers interested in Hjelmslev's development of Saussure's thinking are best referred to the *Prolegomena* itself. Hjelmslev's reinterpretation of 'rapports associatifs' as systems with a limited number of terms and renamed 'paradigmatic relations' is a crucial

contribution. In addition, his formulation of the concept of double articulation (for which Martinet is known) is an invaluable clarification of Saussure's discussion of the sign, Hjelmslev providing a clear theoretical interpretation of stratification in language at a time when Bloomfieldian morphophonemics wrestled aimlessly with the relation between morphemes and phonemes. This work is fundamental to any understanding of the relationship between language and other semiotic systems in our culture and as linguistics crawls out of its philosophical/psychological shell Hjelmslev will in time no doubt be recognised as the genius he was. In the meantime one can only apologise on behalf of the contemporary linguistics ideology which underlies Sampson's reaction.

The rest of the chapter is more than responsible. Sampson sets out clearly the advantages and disadvantages of stratificational linguistics as he sees them. On the plus side he notes: (i) the relative simplicity of relational network notation in terms of the number of symbols used; (ii) the practicality of measuring the overall simplicity of a grammar using this notation (simplification in one part of a TG grammar generally leads to a complication elsewhere, making simplicity next to impossible to measure); (iii) the recognition of strata with distinct inventories and tactic patterns, permitting a clear statement of the differences between phonological, morphological, grammatical, and semological patterns; (iv) the neutrality of relational network notation with respect to speaking or listening (as workers in Artificial Intelligence have discovered, one main problem with TG grammars is that you cannot run them backwards); and (v) Reich's (1969) prediction of the ungrammaticality of centre embedding (which can be blocked only in an ad hoc way in TG grammar and must then be ignored as a performance feature). Sampson has two major reservations about relational network grammar. The first has to do with his feeling that it cannot be used to generate structures, such as relative clauses, involving what he terms structure dependency. I do not think that Sampson's doubts are at all well founded here. Relational networks have since the late 1960s included downward ordered or brackets which make their tactic patterns comparable in generative power to a context-sensitive PS grammar. These can be used to suppress the realisation of a potential constituent under conditions specified by enablers (see Lockwood 1972:section 3.4). I can see no problem in wiring a tactic pattern which permits the realisation of a constituent in a relative clause only if it is not coreferential to the head of the construction. Indeed, stratificational grammar is in a far better position to do this than many TG grammars, in that its semology includes information about the identity of participants in a given text, providing the necessary conditioning information for the rule. Sampson's second reservation has to do with the fact that relational network notation can be used to describe semiotic systems other than language and thus runs the danger of not showing how language differs from other human activities. Sampson is surely being inconsistent here. In the preceding chapter he criticised the incorporation

of universals into TG notation on the grounds that it was premature and precluded potentially significant observations. Any notation system which can be used only to describe language runs a similar danger in showing language to be more different from other semiotic codes than it actually is. For an illuminating discussion of language in relation to other sign systems see Hjelmslev 1961:section 21.

Two final comments before turning to Chapter 8. First, Sampson could have made more of the continuity between stratificational and Bloomfieldian linguistics. He does note that stratificational grammar constitutes a generative formalisation of Item and Arrangement descriptive linguistics in contrast to the Item and Process formalisation of TG grammar (the third model of Hockett 1954, Word and Paradigm, is, incidentally, formalised generatively in systemic linguistics, although Sampson does not note this in Chapter 9). But Hockett's crucial 1961 paper which outlines the stratificational solution to the problem of Bloomfieldian morphophonemics is not mentioned. More discussion of continuity of this and other kinds would have been helpful, especially since the design of the chapter makes it seem as if stratificational grammar derives principally from Hjelmslev when in fact it is a fundamentally post-Bloomfieldian theory. Second, Sampson regrettably makes no reference at all in the chapter to the work of the Hartford stratificationalists on discourse. Unlike Lamb, whose focus has been principally on phonology and morphology, Gleason and his students approached the question of stratification from the point of view of the relation between discourse and grammar (see Gleason 1968, Gutwinski 1976). Their work on the discourse structure of texts in various non-Indo-European languages led to a stratified model of language in which the text was the basic semantic unit, represented in a reticulum including information about participant identification and conjunction. Sampson presumably views text-linguistics as outside linguistics proper and ignores their work on triple articulation here. Such a posture is untenable even for a grammarian, given a language like Kate, whose narrative tests are described by Gleason 1968 as consisting of a single clause complex with portmanteau morphemes realising reference and conjunction between each clause. On the whole, more attention could have been given to how stratificational linguists argue for the necessity of strata. Linguists seem generally to agree that languages consist of sounds, wordings (and perhaps meanings as well). But they do not agree on where the boundaries between strata fall. Indeed, Chomskyan linguistics has by virtue of the power of its mutation rules completely obscured the boundary between morphology and phonology (witness the argument of Halle 1959 against the phoneme) and the boundary between syntax and semantics (it would not be too far-fetched to argue that in its twilight years generative semantics obliterated the boundary between language and the world; cf. Newmeyer 1980: Chapters 5 and 7).

In Chapter 8, 'Generative Phonology', Sampson discusses the Chomskyan approach to phonology. Sampson's feeling is that apart from the personalities involved, all that generative phonology has in common with TG Grammar is an interest in universals. While it is quite true, as Sampson points out, that one thing generative phonology does not do is generate all and only the well-formed sequences of phonemes in a language (their Bloomfieldian preoccupation with the relation between morphemes and phonemes distracts them from this), I would have thought that the main thing that TG Grammar and Generative Phonology share is a generative formalism involving unrestricted rewrite rules with the power to reorder, delete, and to generally mutate in any way a string of symbols. Much more of their ethos flows from the power of these rules than Sampson seems willing to admit.

Sampson begins with a brief introduction to the concept of distinctive features, deriving from Jakobson, and introduced to generative phonology by Halle. I have always found puzzling the argument that once distinctive features are introduced, the phoneme is no more than a handy abbreviation for use in transcription. Hjelmslev's distinction of system and process is relevant here. Distinctive features represent the paradigmatic oppositions which characterise the phonological system of a language; phonemes are the syntagmatic units which constitute the process on the expression plane. Both features and phonemes are units – they differ simply in terms of whether one is describing language from the point of view of chain or choice. In this connection note, for example, that no systemicist would argue that, because his network generates a set of features underlying a clause in a derivation, clauses do not exist! Clauses simply realise features, just as phonemes do. The main problem here seems to derive from a Bloomfieldian obsession with looking at language in terms of composition. Thus a phoneme is interpreted as consisting of distinctive features rather than realising them. The dilettantish theorising of 'a certain style of Continental scholarship' (167) might have helped American linguistics here.

Sampson goes on to discuss the number and types of features proposed and whether features are binary, in light of universal claims made by generative phonologists on behalf of their features and their binariness. Halle's (1959) dismissal of the phoneme is reviewed: the question of whether simplicity alone should be used to eliminate such a unit from linguistic theory aside, Sampson points out that Halle's treatment is not really a simplification – it requires that the level of phonemics be replaced by that of a universally motivated level of systematic phonetics. Sampson then criticises the tendency for generative phonologists to include the phonological history of a language in their descriptions as synchronic fact. His general point is that generative phonology typically posits far more of the history of languages as synchronic and far more of the phonology of a language as innate (or universal) than is warranted. Some discussion of developments in natural phonology in the 1970s would have been useful to amplify this skepticism. The chapter ends on

a political note: Sampson is as puzzled intellectually by the success of generative phonology as he was of TG grammar and looks for some explanation beyond the quality of the ideas involved. His somewhat whimsical conclusion is that generative phonology has been successful largely because Americans are bad at phonetics and secondarily because it is fun to perform facile diachronic analyses of morphophonemic alternations in a language to be included in one's synchronic account. At moments like this one longs for a truly socio-political account of 20th century linguistics and it is hard not to agree with Sampson that competition between schools is far less a battle of ideas than is commonly imagined.

In Chapter 9, 'The London School', Sampson turns his attention to Firthian linguistics. The treatment is very friendly, surprisingly so in light of Sampson's generalist stance, and clears up a number of misconceptions deriving from such chauvinistic and eclipsing works as Postal 1964 and Langendoen 1968. Sampson begins by commenting briefly on the works of Sweet and Jones in phonetics before introducing Firth, the founder of the London School. Sampson's presentation of prosodic analysis is excellent. Firth's system/structure phonology is clearly described and Sampson draws a number of useful comparisons with the Bloomfieldian phonology Firth and his colleagues reacted against. The presentation is refreshing and essential reading for those introduced to Firth's work through the likes of Langendoen 1968. Sampson expresses two reservations about prosodic analysis. First there is the problem of abstraction. He sees a danger in setting up prosodies whose realisation is not a 'natural' class, which danger is enhanced by Firthians' practice of being rather inexplicit about the phonetic realisation of some of their prosodies. In this respect prosodic analysis is more Hjelmslevian than Bloomfieldian phonemics, interested in phonology as an abstract formal system rather than as a principle for reducing languages to writing. However both Firth's 'renewal of connection' and Hjelmslev's principle of 'appropriateness' were designed as constraints on abstraction, which contraints linguists of all schools have been very slow to formalise. Sampson's second reservation has to do with Firth's claim that it is part of the meaning of an American to sound like one. This makes sense or no sense depending on how one defines meaning and for Firth the purpose of linguistics was to make statements of meaning which describe the way in which people use language to live. Defined in this way, Labov's work on the social significance of phonological variation would seem to vindicate Firth.

Sampson's treatment of Firth's description of meaning as function in context is more problematic. Not only does he fail to give an accurate presentation of Firth's views, but he presents them in terms of two points of view that Firth was at pains to argue against. The first of these involves Sampson's tacit acceptance of a number of dualisms which Firth explicitly rejected: word and idea, language and thought, expression and content (note Sampson's distinction (227) 'between what one says and how one says it'). In other words, he accepts the idea that sentences and the like have meaning; for Firth, sentences mean but they do not have a meaning. The second involves Sampson's implicit acceptance of the basic meaning of a sentence as a truth-functional relation between that sentence and some possible world (note his reference (227) to the 'propositional meaning' that a logician would see in a sentence). Thus it follows that *The farmer killed the duckling* is meaningful because one can imagine a world in which it would be true; for Firth one essential part of a linguistic analysis of meaning involves a description of the context in which an utterance functions. It follows that if it lacks this implication of utterance, a sentence cannot be meaningful. In Hjelmslev's terms, meaning can only be discussed with reference to process (or text) in context; system as such has no meaning. Firth's approach to meaning certainly is 'bizarre', as Sampson puts it, if one accepts the duality of content and expression and goes on to analyse meaning referentially as the relation between this content and some world. But seen in its own terms, Firth's approach is perfectly coherent.

Even setting aside these deeper issues for a moment, Sampson's description of Firth's approach to meaning is a complete misrepresentation. Firth made it absolutely clear on several occasions that the central purpose of his theory was to break meaning up into a series of component functions. These component functions include: context of situation, collocation, syntax (including colligation), and phonology. In spite of this Sampson describes collocation as an approach which led Firth 'to EQUATE the meaning of a word with the range of verbal context in which it occurs' (226; Sampson's emphasis but I would have added emphasis if he had not). And context of situation is taken as implying that meaning 'is TO BE INTERPRETED AS acceptability or appropriateness' (226; emphasis added). Firth's famous metaphor of light being dispersed through a spectrum is obviously lost on Sampson. Readers interested in a more sensitive introduction to Firth's technique of semantics are referred to Monaghan 1979. The best example of a Firthian approach to colligation, which Sampson does not discuss, is Allen 1956. Mitchell 1957 illustrates Firth's contextual approach applied to a buying and selling situation type.

Having dismissed Firth's approach to meaning Sampson skips over the work of neo-Firthian linguists on scale-and-category grammar, collocation, and register, and goes on to focus on systemic linguistics. Sampson looks only at systemic grammar, ignoring the work of systemicists on phonology (especially intonation), discourse, register, codes, language development, stylistics, and applied linguistics (including both mother-tongue and second-language teaching), most of which is presumably defined by Sampson as outside core linguistics. This would perhaps be forgivable were it not for the fact that, in the Firthian view of many systemicists, language – even grammar itself – cannot be properly described without taking these functions into account (Sampson makes no

attempt to discuss the functional orientation of the school, which has extended much of the thinking of the Prague School). For something of the true descriptive/ethnographic flavour of systemic research see Halliday 1975, Halliday & Hasan 1976, Halliday 1978 and Halliday & Martin 1981.

Sampson gives a fairly clear presentation of the paradigmatic orientation of a systemic grammar, from which its name derives. Very little attention is paid to the question of how systems are realised – how language is manifested as text, in Hjelmslev's terms. Halliday has been notoriously inexplicit about this, it is true, but Hudson 1971 provides a clear exposition of how systems generate grammatical structures. This lack of attention to realisation (in both Halliday's work and Sampson's account) makes the theory seem more exotic and inaccessible than necessary. Most linguists find it difficult even to think of language in terms of system rather than structure – more than one systemicist has to his chagrin found linguists reacting to his networks as tree diagrams at a funny angle. Sampson's lack of attention to Halliday's functional analysis of English clauses and groups also has the disadvantage of failing to publicly embarrass linguists like Simon Dik, who in his *Functional grammar* (1978) acknowledges none of the work in systemic linguistics whose findings he has presumably rediscovered for himself.

Sampson's criticisms of systemic grammar raise a number of interesting points, many of which have been hotly-debated issues at the systemic workshops which have been held annually in Britain since 1974 (the 1982 workshop moves for a year to Toronto, Canada). He first raises the question of whether there is a stratum of system networks underlying those normally proposed for lexico-grammar (in his dualistic terms, whether semantics and syntax are isomorphic). This strikes me as a straightforward empirical question having to do with whether or not system networks and realisation rules have enough generative power to simply state everything there is to say in closed systems outside phonology. As such it is a rather global issue, not one which can be settled on the basis of one or two examples such as those Sampson proposes. Still less progress can be made if, accepting the dualism of content and expression, one restricts one's definition of content in such a way that the distinction between finite and nonfinite clauses in English is said to have no particular meaning (one wonders how many hundreds of years it will be before Firth's rejection of these dualisms and Saussure and Hjelmslev's discussion of the arbitrariness of the signifié have any major impact on linguistics). A number of papers referring to the issue of stratification are included in the forthcoming collection by Halliday & Fawcett.

Sampson then goes on to criticise the concepts of rank and delicacy as used by Halliday in particular. I am surprised by his outright rejection of the concept of rank, given his interest in constituency as the basic defining property of human language (1975, 1979, 1980). Any grammar incorporating a concept of rank makes stronger claims about constituency

in language than an IC-based one and would thus seem more appealing to a generalist. My feeling is that Sampson's problem here has to do with a preoccupation with syntagmatic patterns in discussing constituency. The concept of rank embodies an empirical claim about the way in which systems cluster paradigmatically in terms of their dependence on or independence of each other. How many ranks a language has, and the number of ranks at which a given unit enters into systemic oppositions, are descriptive questions. For example, Chinese, like other isolating languages, does not distinguish words and morphemes; French, like other syllable-timed languages, does not distinguish syllable and foot. The strongest universal claim that can be made is that all languages have two ranks on each stratum. Turning to the question of the number of ranks at which a given unit must be described (the problem of 'total accountability', as it is termed in systemic linguistics), once again this is a purely descriptive question. An utterance like *Run!* clearly must be described at clause, group, and word ranks if the semantically significant oppositions it realises are to be described; a conjunction such as *because* on the other hand can be generated directly from clause complex systems – it does not enter into oppositions at other ranks. Again languages differ in the number of ranks a comparable unit is relevant to: in English, for example, an argument can be advanced for the recognition of verbal groups, while in an essentially agglutinating language like Tagalog clause and word systems are adequate to generate the comparable unit. I have every confidence that when linguists who have based their description of syntax on IC analysis turn their attention to the paradigmatics of grammar, if ever they do, they will boldly pronounce the concept of rank as a powerful new constraint on PS grammars (we can be equally confident that no reference will be made to tagmemics or systemic linguistics, such is the state of scholarship in our times, as Sampson quite rightly suggests (258, n.17)).

Halliday's concept of delicacy is less easy to defend, especially in the highly provocative formulation whereby he characterises a grammar as an infinite system generating finite texts. But on a weaker reading delicacy provides a valuable challenge to the traditional bricks and mortar view of grammar and lexis in western linguistics. This view depends on a strong syntagmatic orientation and views syntax as the glue which binds words together in sentences. It is this view which underlies both transformational and lexicalist approaches to grammatical description, where the first generates the structures, then adds in the words, while the second starts with the words and adds on the structures. The alternative systemic view is that lexis is most delicate grammar – that the difference between words and structures is one of general vs specific semantically-significant opposition. Interpreted paradigmatically, this means that as system networks progress from left to right in delicacy their features come increasingly to be realised through lexical items rather than structural configurations. Hasan's paper in the forthcoming Halliday & Fawcett collection exemplifies this principle. It is worth noting in passing that such a formulation

does not exhaust the lexico-grammatical description of lexis for Halliday, who retains Firth's concept of collocation, thus treating the acceptability of *a strong cup of tea* and the unacceptability of *a powerful cup of tea* (cf. Sampson, 227) as a lexico-grammatical fact. Note as well that in this view the concept of open and closed class items is replaced by that of those entering into collocational patterns in text and those lacking this mutual expectancy.

Sampson's major reservation about systemic linguistics has to do with the 'role that intuition appears to play in systemic analysis' (234). I find the objection an odd one in that it confuses heuristics and theory. No linguistic theory that I know of has succeeded in incorporating the whole of heuristics in theory – that is, in formulating a set of discovery procedures which will generate grammars out of data (Chomsky has not helped us towards this goal by flatly denying that it is possible). All linguists make use of intuition in constructing their analysis. The crucial question, it seems to me, is not whether intuition is used, but whether intuitions count as data. In TG grammar they do; in systemic linguistics they do not. Systemicists, like Firthians before them, have more than any other school (except perhaps more recently Labov and his colleagues) insisted that it is texts in their social context which constitute the data for which they must account. Firth's concept of 'renewal of connection', the neo-Firthians' 'exponence', and systemicists' 'realisation' are all explicitly oriented to ensuring that Firthian descriptions account for language in use. If systemicists have been at times slow to make explicit the exponence of their descriptions it is because their goals are so much broader than those of other schools. If they have been reluctant to use simplicity as a criterion for deciding between descriptions, it is because they are uninterested in providing descriptions of small arbitrary pieces of language – there is no point in ranking minigrammars in terms of simplicity, since simplification in the short term may lead to complexity overall. Of course these tendencies have been bad PR in an age when it is better to be explicit and trivial than inexplicit and comprehensive. But hopefully, in the long term, the political price will have been worthwhile.

Before concluding I would like to make two political comments. The first is rather fanciful, but will serve I hope to underline the philosophical/psychological bias from which *Schools of linguistics* was written. Imagine that in a couple of generations the descriptive/ethnographic tradition in linguistics achieves hegemony in our discipline. (This will be necessary if linguists are to survive in their present numbers. One wonders how long the Thatchers, Reagans, and Frasers of our world will fund a discipline whose leaders publicly assert that linguistics is useless; see Chomsky 1981a for a recent unequivocal statement. Sampson himself regards applied linguists as a group of charlatans who have duped governments into wasting tax-payers money by supporting them (11).) Imagine then the contents of a book about 20th century linguistics written in that period:

1. Saussure: language as social fact
2. Boas, Sapir, & Whorf: anthropological linguistics in America
3. The Prague School: functional linguistics
4. Pike: language in relation to a unified theory of human behaviour
5. Labov: the study of language in social context
6. Halliday: language as a social semiotic
7. Bernstein: socialisation, language, and education
8. Text-linguistics: Bible translation; cohesion; European approaches
9. Artificial Intelligence: teaching computers to talk
10. Applied Linguistics: contextual theories of language learning
11. Stylistics: foregrounding and connotative semiotics

Biased? Perhaps. But no more so than *Schools of linguistics*. In the Introduction to his *Form of language* Sampson, quoting Mao, and commenting on generalist as opposed to particularist linguistics, suggests as a principle for the conduct of intellectual affairs that a hundred flowers blossom, a hundred schools of thought contend (1975:11). Such is the force of ideology in linguistics that the weeds comprising our ethnographer's imaginary history wither and die at Sampson's hand.

My second comment is unfortunately not fanciful and has to do with two examples of what I consider the essential political irresponsibility of philosophical/psychological linguistics. In 1979 Sampson published a book, *Liberty and language*, in which on the basis of his interpretation of linguistic semantics he argues for a form of ultra-Thatcher-Reaganism, which he refers to as liberalism (in doing so he advocates, among other things, the abolition of public education at ALL levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary; an end to social security payments of all kinds; the deregistration of all trade unions; and so on). A year later Chomsky allowed a piece of his writing on civil liberties to appear as the introduction to Faurisson's neo-fascist volume (1980), which claims that Hitler's racist holocaust never in fact took place. It strikes me as a sad comment on philosophical/psychological linguistics that: (i) it is compatible with political views as different as those of Sampson and Chomsky; and (ii) it somehow encourages the publication of the documents noted above. Chomsky adamantly refuses to apologise for his publication, arguing (1981b) that everyone has a right to be heard and that anyone who challenges this idea is worse than Faurisson. Sampson 1980 makes no attempt to qualify the politics of *Liberty and language*. But Chomsky has allowed his name to be used (and because of his fame that of linguistics as well) by people whose politics he abhors. And Sampson has provided plenty of ammunition for a Razor Gang which in Australia has in the past year threatened the careers of several applied linguists and which has virtually abolished applied linguistic research with its dismantling of the Curriculum Development Centre, the Educational Research and Development Committee, and its more general cuts in education funding. I do not think that ethnographic linguistics would tolerate either of these actions.

It takes very little in the way of semiotic analysis to recognise that the Introduction to a book is the syntagmatic slot which realises the feature [praise]. It takes very little in the way of register and code analysis to realise that the group of 'tyrants' in Canberra that marry our sisters and rule our lives (1979:212) are just part of the realisation of an ideology based on power and deriving from the material distribution of wealth in western society (the idea that small government will destroy this ideology is absurd). I am convinced that as linguists we can be useful, we can be relevant, and we can be politically sensible. Philosophical/psychological linguistics has done no greater disservice to our discipline than to deny these responsibilities.

It should be obvious from the above that *Schools of linguistics* is an extremely stimulating book to say the least. Because of its scope it is not an easy book to review; but it must have been all the more difficult to write and we are indebted to Sampson for a well-written contribution to the history of our discipline. I don't think that many linguists will LIKE the book. Sampson's approach is too original (I should perhaps say too iconoclastic) for that. Generalists are likely to be dismayed by the irreverence of Sampson's discussion of Chomskyan linguistics. Particularists are likely to feel that far too little attention has been paid to the problem of language and social man. Nonetheless I feel confident in predicting that no one will be bored and that we will all have learned something from the book about why we think the things we do (without even at times knowing that we think them).

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There will no doubt be some who will object to the title *Linguistic theory in America*, and claim that the subtitle is a more accurate description of this book's contents: *The first quarter-century of transformational generative grammar*; but at least the clarification does appear, there. Perhaps there will even be some who will quibble at the use of the word 'first', with its implication of further quarter-centuries to come. Given the very promising recent models of Bresnan (1978) and Chomsky (1981), it seems a reasonable implication for generative grammar, though perhaps more dubious for transformational generative grammar.

Chapter 1 deals with 'the state of American linguistics in the mid 1950s' – just before the arrival of the so-called Chomskyan Revolution, which is dealt with in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 follows the changes from *Syntactic structures* to *Aspects.* Chapters 4 and 5 recount the great schism of the late 1960s and early 1970s between Generative Semantics and Interpretivist Theory. Chapter 6 is on 'Syntax in the 1970s: constraining the syntactic rules'. Chapter 7 deals with matters, such as pragmatics, which have often been regarded as being on the border between formal grammar and something else, and Chapter 8 concludes the book with an account of recent developments, including Trace Theory, Relational Grammar and Montague Grammar. The book therefore brings the account remarkably up-to-date in relation to its date of publication.

The author, very modest in his self-assessment, testifies that he 'contributed several uninfluential publications in defense of a deep-structure model of grammar' during the early 1970s. He confesses that as a participant ('however noncentral') in the history that forms the subject of the book, he could be charged with bias. His defence is that it gives him an 'inside view', which perhaps balances the other danger. Certainly he gives a masterly account of his chosen topic: glass-clear, impressively comprehensive, and very accurate. Even if his modest assessment of his own contribution to linguistic theory is judged correct, he has produced a work of outstanding quality in this history, a work which few could hope to write with such command and perspicacity.

He points out in the Preface that he does not intend the book to be an introduction to linguistics – a wise judgement; but it is a superb source-book for the history of linguistic ideas in the twenty-five years that it covers, and could be used to great advantage with senior students who needed to be filled in on some of this background.

It is clear that Newmeyer admires Chomsky, and he shows enjoyment of the near-legendary tales about him. Not that he presents anything that is not accurate; the facts themselves are myth-like. He draws together some fascinating details about Chomsky which are by now widely known. In the late 1940s he was working as an undergraduate on a grammar of Hebrew, a task which had been suggested to him by Zellig Harris. He immediately found himself approaching the task in the framework of generative grammar, working almost entirely by himself. Newmeyer comments that 'there is no evidence that Harris . . . even looked at it.' Apart from Henry Hoenigswald, he goes on, 'few linguists were then even willing to call what he was doing "linguistics"'. It is fascinating to view this early phase of Chomsky's career with the benefit of hindsight, and even more fascinating to find him, a few years later, hawking his work around and failing to get it published. *The logical structure of linguistic theory* elicited a rejection from MIT Press 'practically by return mail' (35). Easy now to smile at their lack of perception, but it would be a brave person who would claim he would have known better, at that stage of history.

This is one level at which the book can be enjoyed, then, the level of reminiscence and musings about human behaviour. It does not make up a large proportion of the book, and there are many more demanding matters to be pursued, but it is certainly not without its interest, and is well done.