

## Blessed are the Peacemakers: Reconciliation and Evaluation

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### Reconciliation <sup>[1]</sup>

In this paper I want to open up, in a very programmatic sort of way, the question of the role of evaluation in discourses of reconciliation. I see this as an important site for what I call positive discourse analysis (PDA), a style of analysis that engages with processes of change that we sense make the world a better place (Martin, in press). I sometimes get the feeling that modernity has mesmerized critique, to the point where an obsession with hegemony rules virtually all critical inquiry; as a result all we end up doing is exposing power and showing why the world is a terrible place. This is not only depressing, but frustrating, since it doesn't tell us what we need to know about change for the better. There is more to challenging power than critiquing it; in addition we need to know how people commune in ways that rework its circulation (Gore, 1993) — personally, locally, nationally and globally. I think it is time to get off the high moral ground and take a look at people we admire and how they get on with what they do. We can learn some things from them that we need to know if we are going to intervene effectively as discourse analysts in the sites that motivate us. Such as reconciliation, for example, in our post-colonial world — I will focus on discourses from Australia and South Africa here, in relation to the legacy of European invasion and the way European and Indigenous peoples are learning to live together in their “new” worlds.

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1. I am much indebted to David Rose for his work analysing the texts from Tutu 1999 and to Joan Rothery and Chris Jordens for their help with the suggestions about attitude and reconciliation developed here.

### Making Peace: Language in Education

I will begin by coming at the question of reconciliation in one local site, where a kind of peace had to be made in relation to the politics of language in education. The moment was the discussion culminating in what came to be known in Australia as the “Christie Report”, the result of a project of national significance on the preservice preparation of teachers for teaching English literacy directed by Professor Frances Christie (Christie *et al.*, 1991). By way of preparing this report Christie assembled a team which projected at least three major voices — education, functional linguistics and critical theory. This was a wise choice at the time, since these groups had been working together for a few years and coming up with some innovative programming that would be widely acclaimed in the ensuing years. But we certainly did not agree about everything, even most things... and the line between complementarity and difference can be a thin one, and we did not always toe the line.


What made difference difficult was the pressure from both curriculum and pedagogy to linearize — whether you are talking about scope and sequence in curriculum, or teaching strategies that enable zones of proximal development in pedagogy, you have to decide what comes first. And coming first necessarily privileges one perspective over another as an orienting point of departure. In debate this would come round to a question of what was really important — what mattered most. And educators, linguists and critical theorists have different views, as we would expect.

As part of the peace-making solution to these differences, one of the team’s linguists suggested setting up three macro-regions underlying curriculum — which came to be called (i) Communities of learners, (ii) Informing theories and (iii) Curriculum. Each of these macro-regions included several components reflecting our group’s major concerns, as outlined in Figure 7.1. The idea was that each unit of work would have to draw on each of the three macro-regions in its formulation, but that within macro-regions curriculum designers could choose which communities of learners, which informing theories and which of pedagogy, curriculum and evaluation they wished to focus on. This

seemed to us to make room for differences across training institutions as far as the interests of staff was concerned, at the same time as avoiding privileging in our own recommendations one voice over another. All in all, this made the formulation of the final report possible; and in discussions, peace more or less broke out.

Figure 7.1


Three Macro-regions Underlying Curriculum



Differences were further resolved by agreeing on the notion of a spiral curriculum, which would allow pre-service programs to return to ideas as often as necessary, in increasing depth, as training unfolds. Our perspective on this is outlined in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2

A Spiral Curriculum



The way in which the macro-regions and spiral curriculum notions might influence programs of study is exemplified below for the training of secondary English teachers.

Units of Work	Curriculum
<p><b>1: Language &amp; Learning</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ontogenesis of speech</li> <li>2. Development of literacy: i. differences between speaking &amp; writing (eg, oral &amp; written texts in same genre) ii. commonsense &amp; uncommonsense coding orientations.</li> <li>3. Pedagogy: what are "commonsense" starting points for English?; guidance in the context of shared experience; visible and invisible.</li> </ol>
<p><b>2: Literacy in English — responding to &amp; producing texts</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Reading: i. Literature: short stories, novels drama, poetry; ii. Story genres from other cultures; iii. Reading the "message"; iv. Factual texts.</li> <li>2. Writing: i. Story genres; ii. Factual genres; iii. Researching information for writing; iv. Interpretive, critical genres.</li> <li>3. Classroom organization: class, group and individual work.</li> </ol>
<p><b>3: Media literacy — responding to producing &amp; critiquing mass media texts</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Focus: analyzing texts in a range of media print, TV, film.</li> <li>• Goal: interpreting and critiquing representative texts of the culture.</li> <li>• Teaching practice: learning techniques for mass production of knowledge — editing layout, writing for specific audiences.</li> </ul>
<p><b>4: Critical literacy in school &amp; society</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<p>Evaluation and role of literacy:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Dialects and standard language</li> <li>2. Development of writing systems as cultural developments</li> <li>3. Cultural perspectives — oral and written cultures</li> <li>4. Literacy and the economy: the role of literacy in a changing world.</li> </ol>
<p><b>5: Language as a resource for meaning — Functional Grammar &amp; Discourse</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Use of contextual model for planning and implementing curriculum genres.</li> <li>2. Use of functional grammar to identify strengths and problems in learners' written texts.</li> <li>3. Use of grammar to provide strategies for developing writing.</li> </ol>
<p><b>6: Language across the curriculum</b></p> <p>13 weeks; 2 hrs per week</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Disciplines in the secondary curriculum: commonsense and uncommonsense.</li> <li>2. Principles of classification and framing used to develop and implement school curricula.</li> <li>3. Shifts in classification and framing.</li> <li>4. Distinguishing regulatory and instructional discourses.</li> </ol>

Informing Theories	Communities of Learners
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Learning theory: zone of proximal development; the spiral curriculum; models of literacy development in English.</li> <li>• Linguistic theory: from proto-language to the adult system.</li> <li>• Sociological theory: development of coding orientations</li> <li>• Functional grammar: analysis of language development from the grammar</li> <li>• Text and context; genre/register theory.</li> <li>• Critical theory: (fictional and non-fictional) genres as sociocultural constructs (narrative theory; discourse, intertextuality, textual polysmy); the reading subject (compliant, resistant and tactical readings); institutional constraints on readers; discourse analysis; feminist and post-colonialist critiques; social subjects negotiating texts; subjective positioning of the writer (authoritativeness in/and writing, gendered texts).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All learners: different experiences of language learning depending on ethnicity, class and gender.</li> <li>• Focus on experience of learners from NESB and "disadvantaged" backgrounds and mismatches with school learning.</li> <li>• Different genres produced by different socio-cultural groupings: dominant, dominated, "marginalized".</li> <li>• Problems of NESB and Aboriginal students in accessing cultural knowledge assumed to be shared by readers.</li> <li>• Culturally specific linguistic resources.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Critical theory: theories of realism; theories of subjectivity; fragmented and interactive audiences, audience targeting.</li> <li>• Discourse analysis: nature and function of news, whose news?, gender positioning.</li> <li>• Media technologies and histories.</li> <li>• Text in context; genres in different media.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All learners to develop critical knowledge of mass media production.</li> <li>• Incorporating different perspectives and knowledge of NESB and Aboriginal learners as resources for deconstruction of contemporary media texts.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Text and context: development of written genres and registers.</li> <li>• Functional grammar: history of development of language system.</li> <li>• Critical theory: social significance of literacy.</li> <li>• Role of literacy in (i) specialized knowledge, (ii) management and public administration.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All groups of learners: high levels of literacy are essential for all students for choices in educational, occupational and community participation.</li> <li>• Focus on needs of NESB and disadvantaged learners.</li> </ul>
<p>Functional grammar:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• participating in dialogue (mood &amp; modality),</li> <li>• distributing information (theme),</li> <li>• analysing experience (transitivity),</li> <li>• chaining clauses (expansion and projection, parataxis and hypotaxis),</li> <li>• assessing events and settings in time (verbal group),</li> <li>• modifying events (adverbial phrases).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All groups of learners: different orientations to grammatical resources depending on ethnicity, class and gender.</li> <li>• Focus on problems for NESB learners: differences between L1 and L2 — interference from grammar of L1 in English learning.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Text in context; genres and registers of subjects in focus; techniques for analyzing text structure.</li> <li>• Functional grammar: subject specific language — technicality, abstraction, personality.</li> <li>• Critical theory: problematising knowledge; critiquing educational knowledge.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All groups of learners bridging from commonsense to uncommonsense.</li> <li>• Needs of NESB, Aboriginal, disadvantaged learners moving from culturally specific commonsense to uncommonsense language.</li> <li>• Reinforcing cultural knowledge through problematising educational knowledge.</li> </ul>

The linguist's solution is an interesting one in retrospect, with respect to the ways it draws on linguistic theory. One dimension of this is stratification — the idea of setting up “higher order” resources which can be instantiated in various ways “below”. Another is the notion of choice — of establishing sets of options as resources from which designers can select. Yet another is the trinocular vision motif — the idea that the same thing can be looked at in different ways and implementations are about phrasing perspectives together in engaging ways. An example of how linguists might go about making peace for others by drawing on their metalanguage (the very last thing of course that they ever do with one another).

This example is a local kind of peace, I know. And I could never have blessed myself this way within Australia; for that kind of thing Aussies have to speak abroad. But there was an engaging local politics at play, and differences did hurt; but we were in the long run committed to making a statement together, and so we had to get our act together — find a way to get along. In the post-colonial worlds we live in differences both large and small are everywhere and we are all negotiating a space for our ever-changing voices in every sphere of our lives — home, work, play, nation, biosphere and so on. The dimension of this I want to concentrate on here is feelings.

### Appraisal: Communities of Feeling

For this we will need a framework, and one which moves beyond the well-known work on functional grammar by Halliday (1994) and Matthiessen (1995). The view of interpersonal meaning in that work focuses on interaction — the function of the clause to negotiate propositions (statements, questions and responses to these) as exemplified in Irene and Ivy's remarks below:

*“I never thought you'd remember me,” said Irene, 37, as the two women threw their arms around each other on the stoep (veranda), crying and laughing at the same time. Ivy, 59, replied: “But after I was assaulted it was you who was there to help me, who entered my cell at night. Can you ever forget someone like that?”*

[Tutu 183]

Related resources negotiate proposals (offers, commands and replies to these) as exemplified in Irene's remarks below:  
**negotiating proposals** [imperative realm]

*She said, “It is fine, do not worry yourself. I will help you.”*

[Tutu 183]

Related to this, via polarity, is modality — resources for expressing probability and usuality in propositions, and obligation, inclination and ability in proposals, as exemplified in the modal verbs and adverbs below:

<i>usuality</i>	<i>He and his friends would visit regularly.</i>
<i>probability</i>	<i>there must have been someone out there who is still alive...</i>
<i>obligation</i>	<i>If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best...</i>
<i>inclination</i>	<i>I would have done the same had I been denied everything</i>
<i>ability</i>	<i>who can give a face to “the orders from above” for all the operations</i>

For work on feelings we need to move beyond these closed system resources and gaze lexically on lexicogrammar. The key system here is attitude and comprises gradable resources for construing evaluation (Martin, 2000a, b). Over the years we have developed a framework which deals with three types of feeling — affect, judgement and appreciation (our take on emotion, ethics and aesthetics if you will). Affect is concerned with construing emotional reactions:

*Humorous, grumpy, everything in its time and place. Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. “We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now.” We were ecstatic. We even celebrated.*

Judgement is concerned with construing norms of esteem and behaviour:

*A bubbly, vivacious man who beamed out wild energy. She, shy intelligent. Even if he was an Englishman, he was particular with all the "Boere" Afrikaners.*

Appreciation focuses on the worth of things, including semiotic objects such as songs, poems, paintings, sculptures and buildings and natural phenomena of various kinds — including semiotic objects such as questions and issues in the example below:

*So I, amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.*

In systemic theory (e.g., Halliday and Matthiessen, 1999) interpersonal meaning is associated with prosodic patterns of realization, and this is certainly true of attitude. Lexical choices resonate with one another to establish the mood of a phase of discourse, generally with one or another of affect, judgement or appreciation setting the tone. Here are some longer examples of emotional, ethical and aesthetic stance:

**AFFECT** (“emotions”; reacting to behaviour, text/process, phenomena)

He became the very quiet. Withdrawn. Sometimes he would just press his face into his hands and shake uncontrollably. I realized he was drinking too much. Instead of resting at night, he would wander from window to window. He tried to hide his wild consuming fear, but I saw it. In the early hours of the morning between two and half past-two, I jolt awake from his ruined breathing. Rolls this way, that side of the bed. He's pale. Ice cold in a sweltering night — sopping wet with sweat. Eyes bewildered, but dull like the dead. At the shakes. The terrible convulsions and blood-curdling shrieks of fear and pain from the bottom of his soul. Sometimes he sits motionless, just staring in front of him.

**JUDGEMENT** (“ethics”; evaluating behaviour)

I envy and respect the people of the struggle — at least their leaders have the guts to stand by their vultures, to recognize their sacrifices. What do we have? Our leaders are too holy and innocent. And faceless. I can understand if Mr (F.W.) de Klerk says he didn't know, but... there must have been someone out there ... who can give a face to 'the orders from above'? ... Dammit! What else can this abnormal life be than a cruel human rights violation? Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder. At least a murder victim rests. I wish I had the power to make those poor wasted people whole again.

**APPRECIATION** (“aesthetics”; evaluating text/process, phenomena)


This legendary 1983 debut by the fallen torchbearer of the 80s–90s blues revival sounds even more dramatic in its remixed and expanded edition. Stevie Ray Vaughan's guitar and vocals are a bit brighter and more present on this 14-track CD. And the newly included bonus numbers (an incendiary studio version of the slow blues “Tin Pan Alley” that was left off the original release, and live takes of “Testify,” “Mary Had a Little Lamb,” and the instrumental “Wham!” from a 1983 Hollywood concert) illuminate the raw soul and passion that propelled his artistry even when he was under the spell of drug addiction. Texas Flood captures Vaughan as rockin' blues purist, paying tribute in his inspired six-string diction to his influences Larry Davis (who wrote the title track), Buddy Guy, Albert King, and Jimi Hendrix. His own contemplative “Lenny,” a tribute to his wife at the time, also suggests a jazz-fueled complexity that would infuse his later work. — Ted Drozdowski, Amazon.

At heart, each of these three kinds of stance involves feeling. But with judgement and appreciation the affectual dispositions we are all born with (and which parents have to tame) get institutionalized so that we can enter into communities with one another. Judgement

recontextualizes feeling in the realm of proposals about how to behave — our ethics and morality, which may in fact be codified by church and state. Appreciation recontextualizes feeling in the realm of propositions about what things are worth — our sense of beauty and value, which may in turn be codified as medals, prizes, marks or monetary rewards. This orientation to feeling is outlined in Figure 7.3 below.

Figure 7.3

Judgement/Appreciation as Recontextualized Affect



It is important to recognize that attitude is an interpersonal resource which we draw heavily on in relation to solidarity. Feelings are meanings we commune with, since we do not say what we feel unless we expect the person we are talking with to sympathize or empathize with us. We express feelings in order to share them... to build relationships; where we misjudge the situation and get rebuffed, then a sense of alienation sets in. The deployment of this resource for building relationships in casual conversation is insightfully treated in Egging and Slade (1997).

### Rhetoric of Reconciliation: Australia

Here I am asking questions about the use of feelings in discourses of reconciliation. We will begin with a speech by the then Prime Minister Paul Keating, at the Australian Launch of the International Year of the World's Indigenous People in November 1992. Keating spoke at Redfern Park, and is generally known in Australia as "The Redfern Park Speech" (e.g., Gratten, 2000); Redfern is a well-known Aboriginal

settlement in Sydney. It is a very moving speech, which I think ranks as Australia's Gettysburg address... like many Australians I find it a source of inspiration, and at the same time a source of frustration when I consider how far we have slipped backwards in the absence of comparable moral leadership during the governance of Australia's current churl of a Prime Minister, John Howard. I will deal with just part of the speech here, using the layout from Keating's website, which I suspect reflects more closely the phrasing of his delivery (when compared with the written presentation edited by Gratten 2000:60–64).

#### Paul Keating at Redfern Park

*...It begins, I think, with that act of recognition.*

*Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing.*

*We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional way of life.*

*We brought the diseases. The alcohol.*

*We committed the murders.*

*We took the children from their mothers.*

*We practised discrimination and exclusion.*

*It was our ignorance and our prejudice.*

*And our failure to imagine these things being done to us.*

*With some noble exceptions, we failed to make the most basic human response and enter into their hearts and minds.*

*We failed to ask — how would I feel if this were done to me?*

*As a consequence, we failed to see that what we were doing degraded all of us.*

*If we needed a reminder of this, we received it this year.*

*The Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody showed with devastating clarity that*

the past lives on in inequality, racism and injustice.

*In the prejudice and ignorance of non-Aboriginal Australians, and in the demoralization and desperation, the fractured identity, of so many Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders.*

*For all this, I do not believe that the Report should fill us with guilt.*

*Down the years, there has been no shortage of guilt, but it has not produced the responses we need.*

*Guilt is not a very constructive emotion.*

*I think what we need to do is open our hearts a bit. All of us.*

*Perhaps when we recognize what we have in common we will see the things which must be done — the practical things.*

*There is something of this in the creation of the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.*

*The Council's mission is to forge a new partnership built on justice and equity and an appreciation of the heritage of Australia's indigenous people.*

*In the abstract those terms are meaningless.*

*We have to give meaning to "justice" and "equity" — and... we will only give them meaning when we commit ourselves to achieving concrete results*

I am not trained in rhetoric, but it seems to me there is some significant repositioning going on here as far as feelings are concerned. As part of the drift Keating begins with affect — *how would I feel if this were done to me?* He then moves on to judgement — *we failed to see that what we were doing degraded all of us.* The he tries to move beyond guilt and recrimination to the vision of the then newly created Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation — *The Council's mission is to forge a new partnership built on equity and justice and an appreciation of the heritage of Australia's indigenous people.* As the text unfolds,

emotion is in a sense reworked as ethics, which is in turn reworked as what I will develop below as politicized aesthetics:

"Emotion" recontextualized by "ethics", re/recontextualized by "aesthetics"

FROM [affect — **feel empathy**] ... We failed to ask - how would I **feel** if this were done to me?


THROUGH [judgement — **respect humanity**] ...we failed to see that what we were doing **degraded** all of us.

TO [appreciation — **reconcile difference**] The council's mission is to forge a new **partnership** built on equity and justice and an **appreciation** of the heritage of Australia's indigenous people.

This movement is outlined as an image in Figure 7.4, drawing on Lemke's (e.g., 1995) notion of metaredundancy (the idea of patterns of patterns of meaning). The drift of the recontextualization process in the speech can be usefully compared with the phylogenetic drift suggested for the institutionalization of feeling in Figure 7.3.

Figure 7.4

Recontextualizing Feeling in Keating's Speech



The main extension to the current model of attitude I am proposing here involves expanding appreciation beyond a concern with the beauty and value of things towards a concern with the composition of community — as reflected in Keating's choice of the evaluative terms *partnership* and *appreciation*:

*The council's mission is to forge a new partnership built on equity and justice and an appreciation of the heritage of Australia's indigenous people.*

This politicized aesthetics is further developed later in his presentation, as outlined below:

*... Maboo is a historic decision. We can make it an historic turning point, the basis of a new relationship between indigenous and non-Aboriginal Australians... And if we have a sense of justice, as well as common sense, we will forge a new partnership... And I say it because in so many areas we have proved our capacity over the years to go on extending the realms of participating, opportunity and care... Just as Australians living in the relatively narrow and insular Australia of the 1960s imagined a culturally diverse, worldly and open Australia, and in a generation turned the idea into reality, so we can turn the goals of reconciliation into reality. There are very good signs that the process has begun. The creation of the Reconciliation Council is evidence itself. The establishment of the ATSIC — the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission — is also evidence....*

So what I am suggesting here is that we bring political values into the picture, and look at the ways in which discourses of reconciliation construe a better world — what kind of better world is it? What matters there?

### **Truth and Reconciliation: South Africa**

Let us pursue this now in the context of reconciliation in South Africa, beginning with the opposite of reconciliation — living hell. The story I am dealing with here comes from Desmond Tutu's book *No Future without Forgiveness*, and tells the story of a white South African woman and her partners' involvement in human rights violations. We will look at Helena and her second partner here:

*My story begins in my late teenage years ... I met a young man in his twenties... It was the beginning of a beautiful relationship....*

*After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman. Not quite my first love, but an exceptional person. Very special. Once again a bubbly, charming personality. Humorous, grumpy, everything in its time and place. Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. "We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now." We were ecstatic. We even celebrated. He and his friends would visit regularly. They even stayed over for long periods. Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless. Abruptly mutter the feared word "trip" and drive off. I ... as a loved one...knew no other life than that of worry, sleeplessness, anxiety about his safety and where they could be. We simply had to be satisfied with: "What you don't know, can't hurt you." And all that we as loved ones knew ... was what we saw with our own eyes. After about three years with the special forces, our hell began. He became very quiet. Withdrawn. Sometimes he would just press his face into his hands and shake uncontrollably. I realized he was drinking too much. Instead of resting at night, he would wander from window to window. He tried to hide his wild consuming fear, but I saw it. In the early hours of the morning between two and half-past-two, I jolt awake from his rushed breathing. Rolls this way, that side of the bed. He's pale. Ice cold in a sweltering night — sopping wet with sweat. Eyes bewildered, but dull like the dead. And the shakes. The terrible convulsions and blood-curdling shrieks of fear and pain from the bottom of his soul. Sometimes he sits motionless, just staring in front of him. I never understood. I never knew. Never realized what was being shoved down his throat during the "trips". I just went through hell. Praying, pleading: "God, what's happening? What's*



*wrong with him? Could he have changed so much? Is he going mad? I can't handle the man anymore! But, I can't get out. He's going to haunt me for the rest of my life if I leave him. Why, God?*"

Today I know the answer to all my questions and *heartache... I finally understand what the struggle was really about. I would have done the same had I been denied everything. If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled with legislation. If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it. I envy and respect the people of the struggle — at least their leaders have the guts to stand by their vultures, to recognize their sacrifices. What do we have? Our leaders are too holy and innocent. And faceless. I can understand if Mr (F.W.) de Klerk says he didn't know, but damnit, there must be a clique, there must have been someone out there who is still alive and who can give a face to "the orders from above" for all the operations. Dammit! What else can this abnormal life be than a cruel human rights violation? Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder. At least a murder victim rests. I wish I had the power to make those poor wasted people whole again. I wish I could wipe the old South Africa out of everyone's past. I end with a few lines that my wasted vulture said to me one night: "They can give me amnesty a thousand times. Even if God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times — I have to live with this hell. The problem is in my head, my conscience. There is only one way to be free of it. Blow my brains out. Because that's where my hell is."*

[Turu 1999:49–51]

As we would expect from a narrative, there is lots of affect — basically a pulse of happiness followed by a sustained prosody of anguish. It is hard not to feel some sympathy for Helena and her vulture,

although the more we know about what the special forces were up to the less likely we are to empathize; reading position is absolutely crucial as far as aligning with attitude is concerned. Below I have highlighted the lexis which explicitly construes emotion; for a richer reading we could extend this to include behaviour which indexes emotion (for example, becoming very quiet, drinking too much, wandering from window to window and so on):

*After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman. Not quite my first love, but an exceptional person. Very special. Once again a bubbly, charming personality. Humorous, grumpy, everything in its time and place. Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. "We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now." We were ecstatic. We even celebrated. He and his friends would visit regularly. They even stayed over for long periods. Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless. Abruptly mutter the feared word "trip" and drive off. I ... as a loved one ... knew no other life than that of worry, sleeplessness, anxiety about his safety and where they could be. We simply had to be satisfied with: "What you don't know, can't hurt you." And all that we as loved ones knew ... was what we saw with our own eyes. After about three years with the special forces, our hell began. He became very quiet. Withdrawn. Sometimes he would just press his face into his hands and shake uncontrollably. I realized he was drinking too much. Instead of resting at night, he would wander from window to window. He tried to hide his wild consuming fear, but I saw it. In the early hours of the morning between two and half-past-two, I jolt awake from his rushed breathing. Rolls this way, that side of the bed. He's pale. Ice cold in a sweltering night — sopping wet with sweat. Eyes bewildered, but dull like the dead. And the shakes. The terrible convulsions and blood-curdling shrieks of fear and pain from the bottom of his soul. Sometimes he sits motionless, just staring in front of him ...*

Today I know the answer to all my questions and *heartache* ... If I had to watch how white people became *dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it. I envy and respect the people of the struggle* — at least their leaders have the guts to stand by their virtues, to recognize their sacrifices. ... *I wish I had the power to make those poor wasted people whole again. I wish I could wipe the old South Africa out of everyone's past* ...

In the part of the story that recounts her husband's disintegration there is more affect than judgement, although her husband's character is dealt with briefly. But once Helena starts interpreting the significance of his activities a burst of judgmental evaluation sets in around the themes of propriety and inhumanity:

*After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman. Not quite my first love, but an exceptional person. Very special. Once again a bubbly, charming personality...* Praying, pleading: "God, what's happening? What's wrong with him? Could he have changed so much? Is he going mad? I can't handle the man anymore! But, I can't get out. He's going to haunt me for the rest of my life if I leave him. Why, God?"

Today I know the answer to all my questions and *heartache*... I finally understand what the struggle was really about. I would have done the same had I been denied everything. If my life, that of my children and my parents was strangled with legislation. If I had to watch how white people became dissatisfied with the best and still wanted better and got it. I envy and respect the people of the struggle — at least their leaders have the guts to stand by their virtues, to recognize their sacrifices. What do we have? Our leaders are too holy and innocent. And faceless. I can understand if Mr (F. W.) de Klerk says he didn't know, but damnit, there must be a clique, there must have been someone out there who is still alive and who can give a face to "the orders from above" for

all the operations. Damnit! What else can this abnormal life be than a cruel human rights violation? Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder. At least a murder victim rests. I wish I had the power to make those poor wasted people whole again. I wish I could wipe the old South Africa out of everyone's past. I end with a few lines that my wasted vulture said to me one night: "They can give me amnesty a thousand times. Even if God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times — I have to live with this hell. The problem is in my head, my conscience. There is only one way to be free of it. Blow my brains out. Because that's where my hell is."

Appreciation in the story is relatively sparse. Early on it is used to value relationships (and arguably personality); later on the main theme is that of life as living hell:

My story begins in my late teenage years ... I met a young man in his twenties ... It was the beginning of a beautiful relationship ...

After my unsuccessful marriage, I met another policeman. Not quite my first love, but an exceptional person. Very special. Once again a bubbly, charming personality. Humorous, grumpy, everything in its time and place. Then he says: He and three of our friends have been promoted. "We're moving to a special unit. Now, now my darling. We are real policemen now... Suddenly, at strange times, they would become restless. Abruptly mutter the feared word "trip" and drive off... After about three years with the special forces, our hell began... I just went through hell...

Damnit! What else can this abnormal life be than a cruel human rights violation? Spiritual murder is more inhumane than a messy, physical murder... I end with a few lines that my wasted vulture said to me one night: "They can give me amnesty a thousand times. Even if

*God and everyone else forgives me a thousand times — I have to live with this bell. The problem is in my head, my conscience. There is only one way to be free of it. Blow my brains out. Because that's where my bell is."*

As we can see, as far as emotional equilibrium is concerned the characters in the story have reached a kind of impasse. Because of ethics (*The problem is in my head, my conscience*), Helena's husband cannot find peace (*There is only one way to be free of it. Blow my brains out*); and while Helena can now sympathize with the people of the struggle, admire their leaders and condemn her own, she cannot find a way to make her husband whole again. The pain in the story does not resolve. For this couple amnesty is not a solution; they end up trapped in a debilitating dialectic of affect and judgement without, apparently, resources to transcend.

The next text we will consider on the other hand is transcendent. It comes again from Tutu's book (the story we just looked at is in fact used to exemplify its first argument). This text is an exposition, which presents an issue and then gives three arguments as to why amnesty is not being given at the cost of justice being done. I have highlighted the conjunctions which scaffold the key stages of this structure:

*So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.*

*The Act required that where the offence is a gross violation of human rights — defined as an abduction, killing torture or severe ill-treatment — the application should be dealt with in a public hearing unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice (for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session). In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights. Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the*

*perpetrator. Many of those in the security forces who have come forward had previously been regarded as respectable members of their communities. It was often the very first time that their communities and even sometimes their families heard that these people were, for instance, actually members of death squads of regular torturers of detainees in their custody. For some it has been so traumatic that marriages have broken up. That is quite a price to pay. ...*

*It is also not true that the granting of amnesty encourages impunity in the sense that perpetrators can escape completely the consequences of their actions, because amnesty is only given to those who plead guilty, who accept responsibility for what they have done. Amnesty is not given to innocent people or to those who claim to be innocent. It was on precisely this point that amnesty was refused to the police officers who applied for it for their part in the death of Steve Biko. They denied that they had committed a crime, claiming that they had assaulted him only in retaliation for his inexplicable conduct in attacking them.*

*Thus the process in fact encourages accountability rather than the opposite. It supports the new culture of respect for human rights and acknowledgement of responsibility and accountability by which the new democracy wishes to be characterized. It is important to note too that the amnesty provision is an ad hoc arrangement meant for this specific purpose. This is not how justice is to be administered in South Africa for ever. It is for a limited and definite period and purpose.*

*Further, retributive justice — in which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator — is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of*

*traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.*

[Tutu 1999: 48–52]

In contrast to the narrative, there is very little affect in Tutu's exposition — and a couple of instances arguably fuse affect with judgement in any case (humiliation, respect):

*... (for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session). In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights. Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator... For some it has been so traumatic that marriages have broken up. That is quite a price to pay ...*

*Thus the process in fact encourages accountability rather than the opposite. It supports the new culture of respect for human rights and acknowledgement of responsibility and accountability by which the new democracy wishes to be characterized ...*

But from the perspective of judgement, the text is full of feeling — not surprisingly since it deals with a moral dilemma:

*So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious*

*issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.*

*The Act required that where the offence is a gross violation of human rights — defined as an abduction, killing, torture or severe ill-treatment — the application should be dealt with in a public hearing unless such a hearing was likely to lead to a miscarriage of justice (for instance, where witnesses were too intimidated to testify in open session). In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights. Thus there is the penalty of public exposure and humiliation for the perpetrator. Many of those in the security forces who have come forward had previously been regarded as respectable members of their communities. It was often the very first time that their communities and even sometimes their families heard that these people were, for instance, actually members of death squads or regular torturers of detainees in their custody. For some it has been so traumatic that marriages have broken up. That is quite a price to pay' ...*

*It is also not true that the granting of amnesty encourages impunity in the sense that perpetrators can escape completely the consequences of their actions, because amnesty is only given to those who plead guilty, who accept responsibility for what they have done. Amnesty is not given to innocent people or to those who claim to be innocent. It was on precisely this point that amnesty was refused to the police officers who applied for it for their part in the death of Steve Biko. They denied that they had committed a crime, claiming that they had assaulted him only in retaliation for his inexplicable conduct in attacking them.*

*Thus the process in fact encourages accountability rather than the opposite. It supports the new culture of*

*respect for human rights and acknowledgement of responsibility and accountability by which the new democracy wishes to be characterized. It is important to note too that the amnesty provision is an ad hoc arrangement meant for this specific purpose. This is not how justice is to be administered in South Africa for ever. It is for a limited and definite period and purpose.*

*Further, retributive justice — in which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator — is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.*

Some of his judgements are like Helena's — everyday evaluations of character involving respectability, responsibility, accountability and veracity:

respectable members of their communities  
 who accept responsibility  
 encourages accountability  
 It is also not true

But many more of his judgements are judicial — they work as a kind of technicalized morality that we associate with legal institutions. Note for example that he offers a definition of a gross violation of human rights, taken from the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. Definitions are a sure sign that we are moving from common sense into uncommon sense knowledge:

a gross violation of human rights — defined as an abduction, killing, torture or severe ill-treatment

Here are some more examples of Tutu's judgemental legalese:

had committed a crime,  
 sees the offence  
 the perpetrator  
 regular torturers of detainees  
 the victim  
 who plead guilty  
 innocent people  
 those who claim to be innocent  
 of reprisals  
 in retaliation  
 not retribution or punishment  
 encourages impunity  
 the granting of amnesty  
 a miscarriage of justice

For certain analytical purposes we might argue that these technical judgements should be left out of an appraisal analysis, since each in a sense refers to a precisely situated ideational meaning within legal institutions. But I do not think their technicality totally robs them of their evaluative role — most seem to carry with them some of their everyday attitudinal power, certainly for lay readers. When Robert Manne wrote for example that Australia's policy of removing

Aboriginal children from their families by force was “technically an act of genocide”, I doubt that for most Australians its technicalization completely softened the moral blow:

*A national inquiry last year found that the government policy of forced removal was a gross violation of human rights and technically an act of genocide because it has the intention of destroying Australia's indigenous culture by forced assimilation.*

[Manne 1998: 63]

Appreciation is sparse until the third argument in the exposition where Tutu develops his notion of restorative justice:

*So is amnesty being given at the cost of justice being done? This is not a frivolous question, but a very serious issue, one which challenges the integrity of the entire Truth and Reconciliation process.*

*... In fact, virtually all the important applications to the Commission have been considered in public in the full glare of television lights...*

*... They denied that they had committed a crime, claiming that they had assaulted him only in retaliation for his inexplicable conduct in attacking them.*

*... It is important to note too that the amnesty provision is an ad hoc arrangement meant for this specific purpose. This is not how justice is to be administered in South Africa for ever. It is for a limited and definite period and purpose.*

*Further, retributive justice — in which an impersonal state hands down punishment with little consideration for victims and hardly any for the perpetrator — is not the only form of justice. I contend that there is another kind of justice, restorative justice,*

*which is characteristic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not retribution or punishment but, in the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships. This kind of justice seeks to rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community he or she has injured by his or her offence. This is a far more personal approach, which sees the offence as something that has happened to people and whose consequence is a rupture in relationships. Thus we would claim that justice, restorative justice, is being served when efforts are being made to work for healing, for forgiveness and for reconciliation.*

Tutu's use of the term justice in the context of *ubuntu* seems at first blush to indicate that he is judging behaviour here. But in fact he is more concerned with restoring the fabric of social relations than with western notions of retribution and punishment contested in an adversarial legal system. Setting up *ubuntu* as a superordinate concept is not unlike the stratification strategy outlined in the first section on page 180. Here is Tutu's characterization of the concept during a visit to Sydney in 2000:

*But we have another kind of justice, restorative justice, based on something that we find difficult to put into English. Ubuntu is the essence of being human. It speaks of compassion and generosity, of gentleness and hospitality and sharing, because it says: "My humanity is caught up in your humanity. I am because you are." A person is a person through another person.*

*An offence breaks a relationship, ruptures an inter-connectedness, a harmony so essential for a full human existence. Ubuntu does not give up on the perpetrator and sees him with a capacity to change for the better and so ubuntu seeks to heal a bridge, to restore relationships,*

*to forgive and to have reconciliation. [Tutu: taking the costly path to peace. The University of Sydney Gazette. 1. April 2000. 12-13.]*

Instantiating *ubuntu*, on the positive evaluation side, we have terms concerned with communal healing:

the healing of breaches  
 the redressing of imbalances  
 the restoration of broken relationships  
 rehabilitate both the victim and the perpetrator  
 the opportunity to be reintegrated into the community  
 restorative justice  
 healing  
 reconciliation.

On the negative side we have terms concerned with damage done:

broken relationships  
 the community he or she has injured by his or her offence  
 a rupture in relationships

The key term for Tutu, judging from the title of his book, is **forgiveness** — which seems in this context to comprise aspects of both judgement and appreciation. Judgement in the sense that someone is generous enough to stop feeling angry and wanting to punish someone who has done something wrong to them; appreciation in the sense that peace is restored. It also seems that for Tutu, forgiveness involves a spiritual dimension, underpinned by his Christianity; the concept transcends ethical considerations towards a plane of peace and spiritual harmony. **In appraisal terms what this means is that a politicized aesthetics of appreciation has recontextualized the moral passion plays of judgement.**

If we take communal healing as one emerging dimension of value analysis as far as the discourse of reconciliation is concerned, then the act which formed Tutu's T & C Commission can also be seen to be concerned with repairing social relations.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
 No. 1111.

26 July 1995

NO. 34 OF 1995: PROMOTION OF  
 NATIONAL UNITY AND RECONCILIATION  
 ACT, 1995.

It is hereby notified that the President has assented to the following Act which is hereby published for general information:-

ACT...

*SINCE the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993), provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence for all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex;*

*AND SINCE it is deemed necessary to establish the truth in relation to past events as well as the motives for and circumstances in which gross violations of human rights have occurred, and to make the findings known in order to prevent a repetition of such acts in future;*

*AND SINCE the Constitution states that the pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society;*

*AND SINCE the Constitution states that there is a need for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but not for victimization;*

AND SINCE the Constitution states that in order to advance such *reconciliation and reconstruction* amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives committed in the course of the conflicts of the past;

AND SINCE the Constitution provides that Parliament shall under the Constitution adopt a law which determines a firm cut-off date, which shall be a date after 8 October 1990 and before the cut-off date envisaged in the Constitution, and providing for the mechanisms, criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall be dealt with; (English text signed by the President.)  
(Assented to 19 July 1995.)

For this analysis I have concentrated on items that do not directly involve judgement. But the following paragraph gives us pause:

AND SINCE the Constitution states that there is a need for *understanding* but not for *vengeance*, a need for *reparation* but not for *retaliation*, a need for *ubuntu* but not for *victimization*;

Here the act systematically opposes what I treated as appreciation above to terms which more explicitly involve ethical considerations:

appreciation (healing)	judgement (impropriety)
understanding	vengeance
reparation	retaliation
ubuntu	victimization

Afro-Christian values are constructed as transcending western justice. Perhaps a better reading of the drift of feeling in the act would be one that follows Tutu's comments in his cost of justice exposition on the meaning of ubuntu:

*the spirit of ubuntu, the healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of broken relationships*

Here order subsumes disorder; peace is restored. These are the values the act wants people to align with in the new rainbow republic. Accordingly it might be wise to group judgement and appreciation together here, under the headings of order and disorder — by way of displaying the attitude to reconciliation the act is designed to enact.

#### order

*bridge, democracy, peaceful co-existence, national unity, peace, reconciliation, reconstruction of society, understanding, reparation, ubuntu, reconciliation, reconstruction; recognition of human rights, truth, well-being, amnesty, amnesty*

#### disorder

*deeply divided society, strife, conflict, conflicts; injustice, violations of human rights, vengeance, retaliation, victimization, omissions, offences*

It might be even wiser to pause for a moment and consider the extent to which the affect, judgement and appreciation framework represents a western modernist construction of feeling. Tutu's Afro-Christian heritage might not factor attitude along these lines. I am not wise enough to gaze beyond my categories here. But I am confident that other cultures should take pause, and look at what I have done through different eyes.

### **Emergent Discourse: Cultures of Peace**


At this point it might be useful to step back a little and reconsider textual instances from the perspective of system, since I am suggesting



that the drift of local weather is changing the climate of our culture in significant ways. Systemically, attitude is part of a more general system called appraisal, in the interpersonal discourse semantics of English. Alongside attitude this system includes resources for incorporating a number of voices in text (engagement) and resources for grading categories (graduation) — as outlined in Figure 7.5.

Figure 7.5

## Appraisal Systems (ATTITUDE, ENGAGEMENT, GRADUATION)



The main options for engagement are monogloss and heterogloss. In monoglossic discourse, evaluation is presented as sourced unproblematically to a single authority — as when Helena introduces herself at the beginning of her story:

*monogloss (elide dialogism) — As an eighteen-year-old, I met a young man in his twenties. He was working in a top security structure. It was the beginning of a beautiful relationship.*

Later of course she uses a variety of resources to dialogize her text, including various types of “projection” as highlighted below:

*heterogloss (reference dialogism) — I can understand if Mr (F.W.) de Klerk says he didn't know, but damnit, there must be a clique, there must have been someone out there who is still alive and who can give a face to “the orders from above” for all the operations.*

Engagement has been designed by Gillian Fuller, Henrike Körner and Peter White, among others (e.g., Fuller, 1998) as a resource for construing heteroglossia in texts. It's capacity for introducing and aligning voices makes it critical to developing the programmatic discussion of evaluation and reconciliation undertaken here.

Another resource which needs to be brought into the picture is graduation. This involves resources for adjusting the intensity of gradable items (turning the volume up and down as it were):

*force (raising intensity) — For some it has been so traumatic that marriages have broken up. That is quite a price to pay.*

Related to these are resources for making categorical distinctions gradable:

*focus (sharpening focus) — We are real policemen now.*

We have already seen the significance of these resources with respect to Robert Manné's use of the term *genocide* above (*technically an act of genocide*). By moving the issue from the ethical to the legal realm he makes it arguable on the basis of United Nations legislation — in a discourse that foregrounds reason over feelings, however morally charged remains the charge.

Appreciation as an emerging discourse of peace is outlined in Table 7.1, taking into account the texts reviewed here and a few closely

Table 7.1  
Appreciation as an Emerging Discourse of Peace

Reconciliation	Positive	Negative
reaction: impact [notability]	important, significant	
reaction: empathy [learning]	understanding, appreciation, valuing, care;	demoralization, hurt, desperation dispossessed
composition: order	tolerance, acceptance, respect, trust ubuntu;	
	reconciliation; peaceful coexistence, peace;	strife, conflict;
	united Australia, national unity, partnership, relationship, relations, cooperation, sharing, cross-party commitment;	deeply divided society, fractured identity;
	redressing of imbalances, restoration of broken relationships, reintegrated into the community, reconstruction of society, reparation, building bridges;	broken relationships, a rupture in relationships, smashed the traditional way of life;
	healing of breaches, rehabilitate, healing	injured
composition: diversity	culturally diverse, worldly, open	
valuation [social justice]	democracy, participating, opportunity, equity;	racism, discrimination, inequality, exclusion injustice
	restorative justice, justice, addressing disadvantage	

related examples I had to hand (for a comparison with work on appreciation developed initially for the visual arts see Martin, 2000a, and Appendix 1 on page 226. As we can see, the largest group of terms falls under the heading of composition and has to do with recomposing social order in a fractured post-colonial world. This is just a glimpse of what is going on and we need lexically focussed corpus studies to follow up this lead. Over to you Birmingham, to carry on.

What we might ask are the implications of this perspective for Human Rights initiatives around the world? If true reconciliation involves transcending ethics, then what role does morality (however defined, by whom) play in making peace? The many tensions over Human Rights issues in relation to “Asian Values” can perhaps be re-evaluated in light of this discussion. Imposing ethical regimes is a modernist solution to difference; this is not a solution that is likely to succeed in a multi-voiced post-colonial world.

We also need to ask in what sense transcending ethics involves recontextualizing ethics. A number of the terms in Table 7.1 can arguably be read as involving judgement, although I do not think this does justice to their impact in the texts I considered above, as I argued there. A recent conference at Curtin University in Perth for example advertised itself as “Human rights: a fair go for all”. Is this just an ethical title? Or, does the meaning of “fair go” in Australian English in a sense transcend morality? Does it mean making room for difference, in the spirit perhaps of the inspiring communality of the Olympic Games in Sydney in September 2000? As Joan Rothery has suggested to me in relation to her work with Maree Stenglin, there is probably more than morality involved in the “deep grammar” of resonant Australian ideals such as the “fair go” and “mateship”; there is a sense of peace and social order there as well, of community and support — a set of resources for reconciliation which indigenous and non-indigenous Australians need to draw on in this time of desperate need.

### Political Aesthetics: Reconciling Values

What I have tried to do here is open up one site for positive discourse analysis, reconciliation, and suggest an emerging resource at play — political aesthetics, which I have flagged here as evaluative resources for re/composing communities. My suggestions can be checked against related processes in other sites, such as diplomacy, mediation, collective bargaining, meetings, counselling and so on — sites where people set aside competitive adversarial posturing, whether codified as judicial proceedings or not, and try to reconcile differences co-operatively. I

am asking what kinds of discourse they use to do so.

sites (reconciliation and beyond):  
diplomacy, mediation, collective bargaining, meetings, counselling...

I am sure appraisal is not the only resource we need to consider. What is the role of stratification, for example? Do we need higher order concepts like *ubuntui*? I recall that during his presentation at a literacy conference at Bachelor College in 1987 that Mandawuy Yunupingu introduced the concept of two-way education in relation to his indigenous language's name for a fish that darted one way, then another, as it swam in streams near his home (cf. Walton and Eggington, 1990). What then is the role of metaphor? Or of symbols, such as the version of the Australian flag with the Aboriginal flag in the upper left hand quadrant instead of the British ensign? What is the role of humour? What is the role of abstract images like the macro-regions introduced in section 1? What is the role of ritual and ceremony? What is the function of display and design as far as the spaces we try to co-operate in are concerned? And the many more resources I cannot yet bring to mind.

resources (appraisal and beyond):  
appraisal, stratification, humour, metaphor, symbols, diagrams,  
ceremony, design...

As a systemic functional semiotician, I am interested in all of these. But let me end with a poignant linguistic example, which comes from a draft of the Declaration for Reconciliation which has been developed by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation. At stake here is John Howard's refusal to support an official national apology for the injustices suffered by indigenous peoples in Australia. Here is his "official" as opposed to his "personal" position (for discussion see Martin, in press):

*The Prime Minister acknowledges and thanks you  
for your support for his personal apology to indigenous  
people affected by past practices of separating indigenous*

*children from their families. However, the government does not support an official national apology. Such an apology could imply that present generations are in some way responsible and accountable for the actions of earlier generations, actions that were sanctioned by the laws of the time, and that were believed to be in the best interests of the children concerned. [Senator Herron writing on behalf of the Prime Minister, John Howard, to Father Brennan in late 1997]*

In an attempt to finesse their way around this sticking point the Council drafted as follows:

*...And so we take this step: as one part of the nation expresses its sorrow and profoundly regrets the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apology and forgives. ... [Draft version, Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation 2000]*

As a linguist I was struck by the clever use of participant identification, bridging to be precise (Martin, 1992). Howard's profession of sorrow and regret (affect) is reconstructed through nominalization as an apology (judgement) — his voice is recontextualized by another in a perfectly balanced clause complex linked by *as* and *so* (appreciation) — what Howard is willing to say becomes what other Australians want to hear. It is a nice compromise, enacting and symbolizing reconciliation through the identification, nominalization and clause linking strategies deployed. Something for a linguist's aesthetic perhaps, but a nice piece of rhetoric as well, in anyone's terms.

one part of the nation  
expresses its sorrow and  
profoundly regrets the injustices of the past

=

the apology

Of course, John Howard was too concerned about the 51% of Australians who are opposed to an official apology to accept this wording. Accordingly the Council replaced *expresses its sorrow and profoundly regrets with apologies* in later drafts. The finesse failed; an opportunity for peace was lost. And Australia is diminished for it. But there are many more resources to try. In such processes, can linguists play a part?

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